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Supreme Court of the United States

October Term, 1975

No.

75-1405

MARSHALL FIELD & CO.,

Petitioner,

VS.

MARIAN SHOUP,

Respondent.

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

To the United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Citations to Opinions Below	1
Jurisdiction	2
Questions Presented	3
Statutes Involved	4
Statement	4
(a) A Subscription Agreement of March 14, 1961 (Appendix G in the separately filed Additional Appendix to this Petition)	6
(b) An "Assignment" of October 25, 1963 from Shoup Engineering Corporation to the Irene Schneider Trust (Appendix H in the separately filed Additional Appendix to this Petition)	7
(c) An "Assignment" of January 21, 1965 from Al- len A. Shoup to Shoup Engineering Corporation (Appendix I in the separately filed Additional Appendix to this Petition)	8
(d) An "Assignment" of August 3, 1968 from the Irene Schneider Trust to Marian Shoup (Ap- pendix J in the separately filed Additional Ap- pendix to this Petition)	9
Reasons For Granting Writ	13
1. Petitioner Is Entitled to Be Sued for Infringe- ment Only by the Owner of 100% of Title to the Patent, and Is Not to Be Left Vulnerable to An- other Suit That Could Be Brought by the True Owner of the Patent, Not a Party to the Action Below	13
2. There Is No Statutory Power or Authority Granted to Patent Office Clerks to Determine the Issue of Title Based Upon Their Interpreta-	

II

tion of the Assignment Instruments Presented for Recording, But Rather It Is a Judicial Function to Determine the Issue of Title Based Upon the Only Evidence That Congress Has Provided for Showing Transfers of Title to Patents, That Is Written Assignment Instruments As Set Forth in 35 U.S.C. 261	16
3. As a Matter of Safe Public Policy, the Legal Rights of Petitioner Should Not Be Dependent Upon the Discretion, Whim, Caprice, or Mistake of an Unknown Patent Office Clerk Not Authorized to Make a Legal Determination of Title, and Not Known to Have the Competency to Make Such a Legal Determination	18
Conclusion	19
APPENDICES:	
Attached to Petition:	
Appendix A-1—March 1, 1976 Opinion of Court of Appeals	21
Appendix A-2—Judgment Entry of the Court of Appeals	25
Appendix B—Oct. 15, 1974 Opinion and Order of District Court	26
Appendix C—June 4, 1975 Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment of District Court	29
Appendix D—Amended Judgment of District Court of June 16, 1975	44
Appendix E—Statutory Provisions:	
35 U.S.C. 261	45
35 U.S.C. 152	46
35 U.S.C. 281	46

III

In Separate Additional Appendix:

Appendix F—Shoup patent	1
Appendix G—3/14/61 Subscription Agreement	7
Appendix H—10/25/63 Assignment	8
Appendix I—1/21/65 Assignment	11
Appendix J—8/3/68 Assignment	12

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases

<i>Agrashell Inc. v. Hammons Products Co.</i> , 352 F.2d 443, 147 USPQ 347 (8 Cir. 1965)	14
<i>Bartok v. Boosey & Hawkes, Inc.</i> , 523 F.2d 941, 187 USPQ 529 (2 Cir. 1975)	18
<i>Crown Co. v. Nye Tool Works</i> , 261 U.S. 24, 43 S. Ct. 254 (1923)	14
<i>DeSylva v. Ballentine</i> , 351 U.S. 570, 109 USPQ 431 (1956)	18
<i>Independent Wireless Tel. Co. v. Radio Corp. of America</i> , 269 U.S. 459, 46 S. Ct. 166, 70 L. Ed. 357 (1926)	14
<i>Kulesza et al. v. American Car & Foundry</i> , 111 F.2d 58, 44 USPQ 488 (7 Cir. 1940)	14
<i>Layne-New York Co. v. Allied Asphalt Co.</i> , 501 F.2d 405, 183 USPQ 132 (3 Cir. 1974)	14
<i>Switzer Bros v. Byrne</i> , 242 F.2d 909, 113 USPQ 168 (6 Cir. 1957)	15
<i>Switzer Bros. Inc. v. Chicago Cardboard Co.</i> , 252 F.2d 407, 116 USPQ 277 (7 Cir. 1958)	14

IV

Statutes

28 U.S.C. 1254(1)	2
35 U.S.C. 152	4
35 U.S.C. 261	4, 9, 10, 15, 16, 20
35 U.S.C. 281	4

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PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
To the United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit

*To The Honorable, the Chief Justice and the Associate
Justices of the Supreme Court of the United States:*

Your Petitioner, Marshall Field & Co., respectfully
prays that a Writ of Certiorari issue to review the
judgment of the United States Circuit Court of Ap-
peals for the Seventh Circuit entered March 1, 1976.

CITATIONS TO OPINIONS BELOW

The opinion and judgment of the Circuit Court for
the Seventh Circuit is printed in Appendix A-1 and Ap-
pendix A-2, respectively, to this Petition. It will not be

published by Curiam Order of the said Court of Appeals under the provisions of Rule 28 of the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals.

The opinions and judgments of the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division, affirmed by the Court of Appeals, consist of:

(a) The Memorandum Opinion And Order of the District Court dated October 15, 1974 ruling upon the issue of title to the patent subject of the action below. This Memorandum Opinion And Order was not published. It is printed in Appendix B to this Petition; and

(b) The Findings Of Fact, Conclusions Of Law And Judgment Order of the District Court dated June 4, 1975, ruling upon the issues of validity and infringement of the patent subject of the action below, and including the same finding on title to the patent. The Findings Of Fact, Conclusions Of Law And Judgment Order have not been published and are printed in Appendix C to this Petition; and

(c) Amended Judgment of the District Court dated June 16, 1975. This Amended Judgment was not published. It is printed in Appendix D to this Petition.

JURISDICTION

The judgment of the Circuit Court of Appeals was entered March 1, 1976.

The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under 28 U.S.C. 1254(1).

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1. Has the Petitioner's established right to be sued for patent infringement only by the legal owner of the patent been abridged by awarding judgment to Respondent on the basis of a false notation of title erroneously printed on the patent through a mistake of a clerk in the Patent Office rather than on the basis of the written assignment instruments of record demonstrating that title to the patent is not in Respondent but resides in another not a party to the action?

2. Should Petitioner remain vulnerable to another action for patent infringement by the true legal owner of the patent whose title is shown by all the written assignment instruments of record at a later date after judgment for patent infringement has been granted below in favor of Respondent who is not truly the owner of the patent but who was only recognized by the courts below as entitled to sue as plaintiff solely on the basis of a false notation of title printed on the patent through a mistake of a clerk in the Patent Office?

3. Which should govern the courts in adjudging title to a patent, the written assignment instruments conveying title in the manner provided in the statute, 35 U.S.C. 261, or the notation printed on the patent when issued as to ownership of the patent, which notation was false through the mistake of a clerk in the Patent Office, the printing of any notation as to ownership not being required by statute?

STATUTES INVOLVED

The statutory provisions involved and printed in Appendix E to this Petition are:

35 U.S.C. 261 providing that legal title to a patent or patent application is transferable by written assignment instrument, and further providing for recording in the Patent Office of such written assignment instruments within three months of the assignment for the protection of later, innocent purchasers for value, if any.

35 U.S.C. 152 providing that patents on issuance may be granted to the legal owner of the patent as such legal ownership is shown in written assignment instruments recorded in the Patent Office during pendency of the application and before issuance of the patent, if such instrument has been recorded before issuance.

35 U.S.C. 281 providing that patent infringement actions are to be brought by the patentee.

STATEMENT

United States patent No. 3,174,863, subject of the action below, was issued March 23, 1965 on an alleged invention of Allen A. Shoup, on a "Smokeless Broiler". A copy of this patent, based on a patent application filed February 13, 1961, appears as Appendix F in the separately bound volume filed as an Additional Appendix to this Petition.

According to the written assignment instruments of record below, full title to this Shoup patent now resides in the Shoup Engineering Corporation, a corporation of

Wisconsin. Insofar as disclosed in the record below, the Shoup Engineering Corporation is still in existence and owns the patent. Although not of record, it is possible that Shoup Engineering Corporation may have since assigned the Shoup patent to some unknown person or firm not a party to the action below.

Neither the Shoup Engineering Corporation, nor any unknown person or firm that might have since acquired the patent from the Shoup Engineering Corporation, was a party to the action below. The Petitioner remains vulnerable to an action for infringement of the Shoup patent that may be brought by the present legal owner of the patent, either the Shoup Engineering Corporation or some unknown person or firm who may since have acquired title from the Shoup Engineering Corporation.

Printed in the heading of the Shoup patent, Appendix F, when issued, is the notation:

"Allen A. Shoup, Janesville, Wis., assignor by mesne assignments, to Irene Schneider Trust."

The printing of such a notation on the heading of a patent when issued is not required by any statute. Such a notation has been customarily printed, as being a possible convenience to the public, by clerical personnel in the Patent Office charged with the printing of patents.

The above notation printed in the heading of the Shoup patent is false. The Irene Schneider Trust, according to the written Assignment instruments of record below, was not the owner, and never was the owner, of legal title to the Shoup patent.

The Respondent claims to have derived her title to the patent from the Irene Schneider Trust. If the Irene Schneider Trust, when purporting to assign title to the

Shoup patent to the Respondent, did not itself then possess title to the patent, then the Respondent received nothing and she now possesses no title whatever.

As only the holder of 100% legal title to a patent is entitled to maintain an action for infringement of the patent (citations below), the Respondent, who has never possessed legal title to the patent, was not entitled to maintain the action below for infringement of the Shoup patent. The action should have been dismissed upon the threshold issue of title for lack of title to the patent, and hence for lack of a proper party plaintiff.

The documents of record below relating to the issue of ownership, considered in chronological order, and which themselves disclose title to now be in the Shoup Engineering Corporation, are:

(a) A Subscription Agreement (Appendix G in the Separately Filed Appendix to This Petition)

This Subscription Agreement (unauthenticated and unrecorded) dated March 14, 1961 obligated Allen Shoup, signatory thereto, to assign in the future to a corporation not yet in legal existence to be known as "Shoup Engineering Corp.", for his shares of stock to be received, his rights briefly identified as—

"All right, title and interest in the design, patent, labor and material and any other right in a smokeless electric broiler, Broilitizer by trade name and general recognition".

This "Subscription Agreement" was *not* an instrument in writing then assigning a patent application, a patent or an interest therein. It was a mere contract to assign in the future.

(b) An "Assignment" of October 25, 1963 From Shoup Engineering Corporation to the Irene Schneider Trust (Appendix H in the Separately Filed Appendix to This Petition)

This "Assignment" *purported* to be an assignment on October 25, 1963 by Shoup Engineering Corporation (which did not on that date possess *any* title) to the "Irene Schneider Trust", of all rights, title and interest in patent application 88,868 (the application for the patent in suit), "EXCEPT FOR A PREVIOUS ASSIGNMENT FOR FIVE THOUSAND (\$5,000.00) DOLLARS."

This "Assignment" conveyed *nothing* from Shoup Engineering Corporation which then held *no* title. In any event, if Shoup Engineering Corporation then transferred any title, it was *not full* title to the application. The "assignment" *expressly* stated that the transfer of title was not complete because of this *previous* assignment to some one not there identified. Presumably, this "previous assignment" was an assignment of a partial interest in the patent. There is no evidence on this point. The "Irene Schneider Trust", by the express terms of the October 25, 1963 "assignment", was therefore *put on notice* that there was another co-owner someplace by virtue of that "previous assignment".

This "assignment" of October 25, 1963 did not convey *any* title to the Irene Schneider Trust because Shoup Engineering Corporation at the time held *no* title. In any event, this "assignment" did not convey *complete* title because of the recited "previous assignment".

(c) An "Assignment" of January 21, 1965 From Allen A. Shoup to Shoup Engineering Corporation (Appendix I in the Separately Filed Appendix to This Petition)

On January 21, 1965, Allen A. Shoup, the named inventor of the patent in suit stated that "I hereby assign, transfer and set over" to Shoup Engineering Corporation his patent application Serial No. 88,868. He added that the assignment was being made in performance of his contractual obligation set forth in the March 14, 1961 Subscription Agreement (Appendix G) for the stock in the corporation by inserting in the assignment the notation that it was made "nunc pro tunc as of March 14, 1961, pursuant to a subscription agreement executed as of that date".

Of course, title passed to Shoup Engineering Corporation on January 21, 1965 when the written assignment was made. The "nunc pro tunc" recital could not change the Subscription Agreement of March 14, 1961 into a written assignment because the "assignee" at that earlier time was *not in existence*. The phrase "nunc pro tunc" is properly used to accomplish something which *should* have been done earlier but was not because of an inadvertence. In the present instance, no assignment *could* have been made back on March 14, 1961 because Shoup Engineering Corporation *did not exist*.

As a result, the Assignment of January 21, 1965 must stand as of its own date. Hence title to the Shoup patent now *resides solely* in the Shoup Engineering Corporation. It alone possesses the *right* to sue on the patent.

(d) An "Assignment" of August 3, 1968 From the Irene Schneider Trust to Marian Shoup (Appendix J in the Separately Filed Appendix to This Petition)

On August 3, 1968 the Irene Schneider Trust *purported* to assign full title to the patent in suit to Marian Shoup, the Respondent.

However, on that date the Irene Schneider Trust, as we have seen, did not possess any title, and in any event did not possess full title. When the Irene Schneider Trust was proceeding on the pretense that it had itself received title from the Shoup Engineering Corporation by the "Assignment" of October 25, 1963, the fact is that on that date of October 25, 1963, the Shoup Engineering Corporation possessed *no* title whatever which it could transfer. The Shoup Engineering Corporation did not receive title until January 21, 1965 when Allen A. Shoup first assigned his title to the corporation. Furthermore, if the Shoup Engineering Corporation on October 25, 1963 had any title (but which is denied), it is definite that *full* title was not even being purported to be transferred to the Irene Schneider Trust. This is clear from the reservation in the purported assignment of October 25, 1963 that title "EXCEPT FOR A PREVIOUS ASSIGNMENT FOR FIVE THOUSAND (\$5,000.00) DOLLARS" was being conveyed.

Thus, by the purported "assignment" of August 3, 1968, the Irene Schneider Trust received *nothing*, and certainly did not receive full title.

It was *impossible* for the Irene Schneider Trust to legally convey full title to the patent in suit to Marian Shoup, the Respondent.

It thus appears from the written assignment instruments, which Congress has provided by 35 U.S.C. 261

govern the manner in which title is conveyed, that title to the Shoup patent resides in the Shoup Engineering Corporation and not in the Respondent.

Choosing to disregard these written assignment instruments in the record, the courts below elected to borrow and depend upon the determination of title as made by some unknown person in the Patent Office in performing the clerical work of printing the patent. When confronted with the question of whether the statutory provision for transfer of legal title, 35 U.S.C. 261, that is, the written assignment instruments of record, should govern, or whether the mistaken conclusion of some unknown clerk in the Patent Office should govern, the courts below abdicated their judicial determination of title to that unknown clerk.

This abdication of authority, and the delegating of such judicial responsibility to some person not possessing the legal authority and not shown to have the judicial competence to render such judgments, is revealed in the ruling of the District Court on title and affirmed by the Court of Appeals. In the District Court's Memorandum Opinion And Order of October 15, 1974, Appendix B to this Petition, ruling on the issue of title, the District Court ruled:

"On March 23, 1965, the patent issued, and on its face was issued to Irene Schneider Trust by assignment from Allen A. Shoup. The Court *accepts this statement on the face of the patent as prima facie evidence of ownership at that date.* It is not necessary to consider the contention that this recitation was the result of a Patent Office error, since the alleged infringer has no standing in any event to raise that issue."

"Defendant here charged with infringement has a right to insist that it need respond only to the owner of the patent. That owner, however, for purposes of this action, is *presumed to be the owner* reflected on the Patent Office records. Such owner in this case is Marian Shoup. The *burden of overcoming the correctness of this record is on defendant.* It is a burden defendant has not met. Therefore, defendant's motion to dismiss for want of a proper party plaintiff is denied." (Emphasis added)

This initial ruling on title was merely adopted by the District Court in its June 4, 1975 Findings Of Fact, Conclusions Of Law And Judgment Order (Appendix C to this Petition) wherein it concluded (adopting verbatim the finding submitted by Respondent) in Finding 2 that Respondent "has the entire right, title and interest in and to U.S. Patent No. 3,174,863, together with the right to sue and recover for past infringement thereof", and in Conclusion Of Law 3 that Respondent "is the owner of the Shoup patent No. 3,174,863".

The Court of Appeals adopted this same election of the District Court to depend upon the incorrect notation of title as then being in the Irene Schneider Trust as printed on the patent when issued rather than upon the written assignment instruments of record showing title to be in the Shoup Engineering Corporation, as shown by its Order of affirmance (Appendix A to this Petition) wherein the Court of Appeals stated:

"At the evidentiary hearing on the question of the nature and extent of plaintiff's ownership of the patent in suit, plaintiff presented documents and oral evidence in support of her claim of ownership. Defendant introduced no direct evidence but by virtue

of cross-examination and oral argument addressed to the documentary evidence, contended that plaintiff did not make out a prima facie showing of ownership in discharge of her burden to do so.

The trial court held that Marian Shoup is the owner of all right, title and interest in and to the patent in suit and had the capacity to bring this action as plaintiff. Based upon our independent examination of the record, as well as our consideration of the trial court's memorandum of decision, we hold that the trial court did not err in so ruling. *We approve of and adopt the initial memorandum of decision of the trial court on this issue. Shoup v. Marshall Field & Co., N.D. Ill., F. Supp. (October 15, 1974)."*

The mistake made by the Patent Office clerical personnel in printing the erroneous notation on the heading of the patent might be attributed to confusion arising from the fact that there were sent into the Patent Office for recording on the same day *both* the:

Assignment of October 25, 1963 from Shoup Engineering Corporation, at a time when it possessed *no* title, to the Irene Schneider Trust, and the

Assignment of January 21, 1965 from Allen A. Shoup, who as named inventor *had* original title, to the Shoup Engineering Corporation, present record owner of title.

Both of these assignments were recorded January 22, 1965, two months prior to the issuance of the Shoup patent on March 23, 1965.

The "Subscription Agreement" of March 14, 1961, not being an assignment or even purporting to be an assign-

ment, was not recorded or even presented for recording. It was ignored as an element in seeking any purported claim of title to the Shoup patent to be in the Irene Schneider Trust and hence to Respondent.

The Respondent, claiming title through the Irene Schneider Trust which itself had no title, possessed no title, if the determination of title is to be based on the written assignment instruments of record rather than on the mistaken conclusion of an unknown clerk in the Patent Office, having neither the competence nor authority to determine title from the two assignment instruments sent on the same date for recording.

REASONS FOR GRANTING WRIT

1. **Petitioner Is Entitled to Be Sued for Infringement Only by the Owner of 100% of Title to the Patent, and Is Not to Be Left Vulnerable to Another Suit That Could Be Brought by the True Owner of the Patent, Not a Party to the Action Below.**

Under the provisions of 35 U.S.C. 281, "A *patentee* shall have remedy by civil action for infringement of his patent". A "patentee" is the owner of the patent. In the first instance, the named inventor is the owner and hence the patentee. If there has been a transfer of ownership by the named inventor, then the one receiving ownership through written assignment instrument is the patentee. Of course, a purported "assignment" from someone not possessing title is a nullity and conveys nothing. It is the true holder of complete ownership of a patent who as patentee is entitled to sue and recover for its infringement.

A court has no jurisdiction to proceed with a patent infringement action unless there are represented as plaintiffs all owners of the patent.

Independent Wireless Tel. Co. v. Radio Corp. of America, 269 U.S. 459, 468, 46 S. Ct. 166, 70 L. Ed. 357 (1926);

Switzer Bros. Inc. v. Chicago Cardboard Co., 252 F.2d 407, 116 USPQ 277 (7 Cir. 1958).

Proof of ownership of the complete patent is a requisite to the right to sue for infringement:

Agrashell Inc. v. Hammons Products Co., 352 F.2d 443, 147 USPQ 347 (8 Cir. 1965);

Layne-New York Co. v. Allied Asphalt Co., 501 F.2d 405, 183 USPQ 132 (3 Cir. 1974).

The District Court below in the course of the evidentiary hearing of July 11, 1974 on the question of title then recognized this well established principle of law by the statement:

"The Court. We have cross motions for summary judgment on the issue of title, and of course, if the plaintiff has not established title, I think it disposes of the underlying case".

In a patent infringement action the burden is on the plaintiff to prove by competent evidence full ownership of the patent and of the capacity to bring the action as party plaintiff:

Crown Co. v. Nye Tool Works, 261 U.S. 24, 43 S. Ct. 254 (1923);

Kulesza et al. v. American Car & Foundry, 111 F.2d 58, 44 USPQ 488 (7 Cir. 1940);

Switzer Bros. v. Byrne, 242 F.2d 909, 113 USPQ 168 (6 Cir. 1957).

Thus, it was incumbent upon the Respondent to prove her full ownership of the Shoup patent. It was not incumbent upon the Petitioner to prove the negative, that is to prove that Respondent did not own the patent. Yet such lack of ownership was established by the *only* competent evidence of record on the issue of title. The written assignment instruments of record all conclusively establish that title resides in the Shoup Engineering Corporation and not in the Respondent. The contrary mistaken notation erroneously printed on the patent does not, and can not, cancel and negative the show of title evidenced by the written assignment instruments of record, which are the only means of conveying title under the authority of the statute, 35 U.S.C. 261.

The absence of any ownership of the Shoup patent by Respondent necessarily leaves Petitioner vulnerable to a later action for infringement of the same patent by Shoup Engineering Corporation (or by a presently unknown person or firm to whom Shoup Engineering Corporation may have since assigned the patent, if any).

The Respondent is in fact and in law a stranger to title to the patent and possessed no right whatever to bring the action against Petitioner. The error of the Courts below has been in ignoring the statutory provisions for transfer of title to a patent and thus improperly leaving Petitioner to the peril and risk of being later sued for infringement. The Respondent has no more right to a recovery for infringement of the patent than would any stranger.

2. There Is No Statutory Power or Authority Granted to Patent Office Clerks to Determine the Issue of Title Based Upon Their Interpretation of the Assignment Instruments Presented for Recording, But Rather It Is a Judicial Function to Determine the Issue of Title Based Upon the Only Evidence That Congress Has Provided for Showing Transfers of Title to Patents, That Is Written Assignment Instruments As Set Forth in 35 U.S.C. 261.

It is important to the preservation of the legal system that rights, such as ownership of patents, be judicially determined on the basis of legal and competent evidence. Such a determination of legal rights should not be lightly passed off and delegated to unknown clerical personnel in any agency of the Government.

Petitioner was not a party to the determination of title as made by Patent Office personnel and as appearing in the printed notation on the patent when issued. That determination was made without a hearing and without an opportunity for the Petitioner to be heard by the Patent Office in the course of the unofficial determination made when printing the patent.

Petitioner had and has the legal right to be sued for infringement only by the true holder of all legal title to the patent. Yet, that right has been denied the Petitioner by the simple expedient of the courts below in depending upon the unofficial determination made by unknown Patent Office clerical personnel handling the printing of the patent. The Petitioner has been denied the legal right to be sued only by the legal owner through the admitted election of the lower courts to disregard the written assignment records and to instead adopt and to depend upon the false notation printed on the patent.

If one were sued for alleged trespass upon real property, besides denying the trespass, it would not be considered to be a mere "technical defense" to point out that the plaintiff was a stranger to title and that according to the written deeds of conveyance, the property was really owned by another.

There has not been found any other decision wherein the legal right—that is, the legal right to be sued only by the legal owner of a patent—was denied on the basis of an erroneous notation concerning title printed on a patent. Heretofore, the courts have followed the statute in recognizing only written assignment instruments as evidence of legal title to a patent. So far as known, the courts have not followed the practice of permitting an agency to make such a legal determination in the place and stead of a judicial determination by the courts.

The Second Circuit Court of Appeals in a recent decision involving a legal determination of rights to a copyright declined to adopt the determination of the legal right as had been made by personnel of the Copyright Office. Rather, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals insisted on making a *judicial* determination based on the law and the evidence. In this parallel decision involving the legal right to a copyright, the Court said:

"Judge Owen also relied on the form provided by the Register of Copyrights (Circular 1B) which defines 'posthumous' as a 'work first published and copyrighted after the death of the author.' And yet the Copyright Office has no authority to give opinions or define legal terms and its interpretation on an issue never before decided should not be given con-

trolling weight. See *DeSylva v. Ballentine*, 351 U.S. 570, 577-78, 109 USPQ 431, 433-434 (1956)."

Bartok v. Boosey & Hawkes, Inc., 523 F.2d 941, 187 USPQ 529 (2 Cir. 1975).

In the above 1956 decision cited by the Second Court of Appeals, this Supreme Court declined to adopt, and to base its decision on, the legal interpretation that had been given by the Copyright Office involving ownership of a copyright but itself made its own judgment on the question, stating:

"Although we would ordinarily give weight to the interpretation of an ambiguous statute by the agency charged with its administration, cf. *Mazer v. Stein*, 347 U.S. 201, 211-213, 100 USPQ 325, 330-331, we think the Copyright Office's explanation of its practice deprives the practice of any force as an interpretation of the statute, and we therefore do not rely on it in this instance."

DeSylva v. Ballentine, 351 U.S. 570, 109 USPQ 431 (1956).

3. **As a Matter of Safe Public Policy, the Legal Rights of Petitioner Should Not Be Dependent Upon the Discretion, Whim, Caprice, or Mistake of an Unknown Patent Office Clerk Not Authorized to Make a Legal Determination of Title, and Not Known to Have the Competency to Make Such a Legal Determination.**

It is important to the liberties and property of all citizens that their legal rights be determined by the courts on the basis of competent legal evidence, and not be determined by unknown agency personnel in an ex parte

procedure wherein the determination may be based on the mistake, whim, caprice, carelessness or possible fraud on the part of such personnel.

Such a safe public policy has been violated here where the lower courts have knowingly chosen to adopt and use the fallacious determination by a Patent Office clerk that the Shoup patent when issued was owned by the Irene Schneider Trust in the face of, and despite, all the competent evidence found in the written assignment instruments of record that the patent was owned by the Shoup Engineering Corporation.

This safe public policy based on fairness and just treatment is an aspect of due process of law to which the Petitioner should be held entitled.

An account of the manner in which the Courts below treated such an important right of Petitioner when sued for patent infringement, provides its own commentary.

CONCLUSION

The fundamental right of an alleged patent infringer to be sued only by the legal owner of the patent has been denied to Petitioner.

The Petitioner has been left vulnerable to a later action brought by the true owner of the patent as established by all the written assignment instruments of record by the award of judgment by the courts below in favor of Respondent, a stranger to title.

Legal determination of title to a patent monopoly granted by the Federal Government is not to be made by unknown personnel in the Patent Office but is to be made

by the courts on the basis of written assignment instruments conveying title in accordance with the provisions of 35 U.S.C. 261.

There is a conflict between the Seventh Circuit judgment below as relating to ownership of a patent and the decisions both of this Court and of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals as relating to ownership of a copyright.

The decisions below are deserving of review by this Supreme Court by means of a Writ of Certiorari.

A reversal of the judgment below will aid in clarifying and making definite the patent laws and particularly the law relating to the right to sue for patent infringement.

Respectfully submitted,

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APPENDIX A-1

Opinion of Court of Appeals

(Dated March 1, 1976)

No. 75-1729

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
For the Seventh Circuit

MARIAN SHOUP,
Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.

MARSHALL FIELD & COMPANY,
Defendant-Appellant.

ORDER

We are concerned here with questions of validity and infringement of United States Patent No. 3,174,863, entitled "Smokeless Broiler." The patent was issued on February 13, 1961, to the inventor Allen A. Shoup, now deceased. Plaintiff Marian Shoup is the inventor's widow and claims the entire right, title and interest in the Shoup patent.

Defendant Marshall Field & Company has sold Dominion smokeless electric broilers in this district which are alleged to infringe the Shoup broiler. Dominion Electric Corporation, now succeeded by Scovill Manufacturing Company, manufactures the Dominion broiler and is defending this action on behalf of Marshall Field & Company.

Initially in this proceeding, on May 10, 1971, the district court granted defendant's motion for summary judgment for non-infringement only of the Shoup patent. On appeal to our court, we reversed this summary judgment on March 1, 1973, by an unpublished order and remanded the cause for trial on the merits.

By counterclaim, defendant raised the issue of whether plaintiff had title in the patent and capacity to sue. This issue, as well as others, were tried to the court without the intervention of a jury. Following a hearing on this issue, the trial court held plaintiff to be the owner of the patent in suit and a proper party plaintiff. Defendant's motion for reconsideration was denied.

Next followed a trial on the issues of validity and infringement. After considering all elements of these issues and the defenses thereto, the trial court entered appropriate findings of fact and stated conclusions of law, with a resulting judgment for plaintiff. Briefly, the court held the Shoup patent to be valid and infringed by the Dominion broiler and enjoined defendant from further infringement. Defendant's counterclaim asserting affirmative defenses was dismissed with prejudice. Defendant was ordered to pay plaintiff such damages arising from the patent infringement as might be determined by an accounting. Other questions of relief, including costs, increasing damages, interest and attorney's fees were reserved until the accounting period.

Defendant has appealed from the final judgment.

I.

At the evidentiary hearing on the question of the nature and extent of plaintiff's ownership of the patent in suit, plaintiff presented documents and oral evidence in

support of her claim of ownership. Defendant introduced no direct evidence but by virtue of cross-examination and oral argument addressed to the documentary evidence, contended that plaintiff did not make out a prima facie showing of ownership in discharge of her burden to do so.

The trial court held that Marian Shoup is the owner of all right, title and interest in and to the patent in suit and had the capacity to bring this action as plaintiff. Based upon our independent examination of the record, as well as our consideration of the trial court's memorandum of decision, we hold that the trial court did not err in so ruling. We approve of and adopt the initial memorandum of decision of the trial court on this issue. *Shoup v. Marshall Field & Co.*, N.D. Ill., F. Supp. (October 15, 1974).

II.

At the conclusion of the trial on the issues of validity and infringement, the district court filed 66 findings of fact and entered 24 conclusions of law, followed by an appropriate judgment favorable to the plaintiff. Based upon our consideration of the record as a whole, together with the briefs and oral arguments of all parties, it is our considered judgment that the district court's findings are not clearly erroneous and find substantial support in the record and that the conclusions correctly state the applicable law with appropriate citations of authority.

The trial court found that the representative prior art shows both overfired and underfired broilers, but does not teach a smokeless and flameless broiler. The prior art relied on by defendant does not teach a smokeless and flameless broiler. The district court's findings Nos. 22 through 30 specifically consider and distinguish the prior art relied upon by defendant.

During the trial, tests were performed before the trial judge which proved to his satisfaction that the Shoup Model No. 5 broiler and also the Toastmaster, Farberware, Cory and the alleged infringing Dominion broilers were smokeless and flameless broilers. No tests were performed by defendant, and defendant's attending expert did not testify as to the results. The manufacturers of the Toastmaster and Cory broilers were licensed under the Shoup patent. The Shoup broiler was developed and sold prior to the other broilers tested. The Black Angus B-67 broiler, which preceded the Shoup patent, was also tested but did not operate smokelessly and flamelessly.

Upon careful consideration of the contentions both pro and con, we have concluded that Rule 52(a), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 28 U.S.C., is applicable here. As hereinabove stated, we hold that the findings of fact entered by the trial court are not clearly erroneous.

Accordingly, on the authority of Judge McGarr's findings, conclusions and memorandum of decision, *Shoup v. Marshall Field & Co.*, N.D. Ill., F. Supp. (June 4, 1975) which we adopt, the judgment appealed from is in all respects affirmed.¹

The clerk of this court is directed to enter an appropriate order of affirmance, with costs to be paid by defendant.

AFFIRMED.

1. The final judgment order was amended by the trial court to eliminate any injunctive relief against Scovill Manufacturing Company.

APPENDIX A-2

Judgment Entry of the Court of Appeals

(Dated March 1, 1976)

No. 75-1729

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
For the Seventh Circuit

MARIAN SHOUP,
Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.

MARSHALL FIELD & COMPANY,
Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal From the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois Eastern Division, No. 69 C 1682, Frank J. McGarr, Judge.

This cause came on to be heard on the transcript of the record from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division, and was argued by counsel.

On consideration whereof, it is ordered and adjudged by this court that the judgment of the said District Court in this cause appealed from be, and the same is hereby, **AFFIRMED**, with costs, in accordance with the order of this Court entered this date.

APPENDIX B

Opinion and Order of District Court

(Dated October 15, 1974)

No. 69 C 1682

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
For the Northern District of Illinois
Eastern Division

MARIAN SHOUP,
Plaintiff,

v.

MARSHALL FIELD & COMPANY,
Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

This is a civil action brought by Marian Shoup for the alleged infringement of a patent on a smokeless broiler, the alleged infringer being the defendant Marshall Field & Company. The case has had a long history, including an appeal, reversal, and remand. In recent months and upon the eve of trial, the defendant moved for summary judgment on the threshold issue of patent ownership, claiming to possess newly-discovered evidence that the plaintiff does not possess a sufficient title in the patent to maintain this suit.

After a denial of this defendant's motion for summary judgment on the grounds that there exists a material issue of fact, the Court ordered a hearing for the resolution of the facts upon which to predicate a decision as to title,

recognizing that ownership in the patent was a condition precedent to the plaintiff maintaining this action.

On July 11, 1974, an evidentiary hearing was had on the question of the nature and extent of the plaintiff's ownership of the patent in suit. In the relevant allegation of the complaint, plaintiff Shoup alleges that she is the widow of Allen A. Shoup and the owner of the entire right title interest in and to said United States Letters Patent No. 3,174,863, together with the right to recover for any and all past infringement of said Letters Patent. Defendant, in its answer, denies the allegation of ownership.

At the hearing, plaintiff presented documents and oral testimony in support of the allegation of ownership. Defendant introduced no direct evidence but by virtue of cross examination and arguments addressed to the documentary evidence, contends that the plaintiff did not make a prima facie showing of ownership.

The evidence establishes that, as of the date of the issuance of the patent, that is March 23, 1965, the patent in suit was granted to the Irene Schneider Trust. The Court finds the following events relevant to the chain of title to this patent:

On March 23, 1965, the patent issued, and on its face was issued to Irene Schneider Trust by assignment from Allen A. Shoup. The Court accepts this statement on the face of the patent as prima facie evidence of ownership at that date. It is not necessary to consider the contention that this recitation was the result of a Patent Office error, since the alleged infringer has no standing in any event to raise that issue.

Plaintiff's Exhibit 5, on assignment dated August 5, 1968, transfers ownership in the patent from the Irene

Schneider Trust to Marian Shoup. This assignment was recorded with the Patent Office on August 12, 1968. Other exhibits reflect the title to the patent to have been the subject of a Walworth County Circuit Court order arising out of creditors' claims, and include a variety of other documents which may or may not be inconsistent with the contentions as to title advanced by plaintiff. Defendant, of course, was not party to this litigation or to these agreements.

Patent Office records reveal that between the filing date in 1961 and the date of allowance in 1965, there is recorded a March 4, 1961 assignment from Inventor Allen Shoup to Shoup Engineering Corporation, and a 1963 assignment from Shoup Engineering Corporation to the Irene Schneider Trust.

The late nunc pro tunc filing of the first of these assignments does not derogate from the Court's conclusion that as to all persons not party to these assignments, including defendant Marshall Field, the owner of the patent in issue as of August 3, 1968 was and is plaintiff, Marian Shoup.

Defendant here charged with infringement has a right to insist that it need respond only to the owner of the patent. That owner, however, for purposes of this action, is presumed to be the owner reflected on the Patent Office records. Such owner in this case is Marian Shoup. The burden of overcoming the correctness of this record is on defendant. It is a burden defendant has not met. Therefore, defendant's motion to dismiss for want of a proper party plaintiff is denied.

The Court finds that the challenge to plaintiff's ownership right in the patent was an issue raised in good faith

and not frivolous. Therefore, plaintiff's motion for the allowance of costs and fees on the title issue is denied.

ENTER:

/s/ FRANK J. MCGARR
United States District Judge

APPENDIX C

Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment of District Court

(Dated June 4, 1975)

No. 69 C 1682

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
For the Northern District of Illinois
Eastern Division

MARIAN SHOUP,
Plaintiff,

v.

MARSHALL FIELD & CO., an Illinois corporation,
Defendant.

FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND JUDGMENT ORDER

FINDINGS OF FACT

1. This is a civil action for infringement of U.S. Patent No. 3,174,863, entitled "Smokeless Broiler". Plaintiff seeks an injunction against infringement and damages.

Defendant denies infringement, avers by way of affirmative defenses the patent is invalid, and counterclaims for declaratory judgment that the patent is invalid and not infringed by defendant.

2. United States Letters Patent 3,174,863 was duly and legally issued to Allen A. Shoup, now deceased, on February 13, 1961.

3. The plaintiff, Marian Shoup, is the widow of the inventor, Allen A. Shoup; was at the time of filing this action a resident of Chicago, Illinois; is now a resident of Tustin, California; and has the entire right, title and interest in and to U.S. Patent No. 3,174,863, together with the right to sue and recover for past infringement thereof.

4. The defendant, Marshall Field & Co., is an Illinois corporation having an office and principal place of business at Chicago, Illinois; and has sold Farberware and Dominion smokeless electric broilers in this district which are alleged to be infringed.

5. The Farberware broiler is made by the S.W. Farber Division of Walter Kidde & Co.; and the complaint was dismissed as to the Farberware infringement on December 24, 1970, pursuant to a license granted to Walter Kidde & Co.

6. Dominion Electric Corp., now succeeded by Scovill Manufacturing Co., makes the Dominion smokeless electric broiler, and has defended this action on behalf of the defendant, Marshall Field & Co.

7. This Court has jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter of the complaint, and venue is properly laid in this judicial district as to defendant, Marshall Field & Co.

8. The patent in suit relates to an electric broiler for cooking foods, and the invention lies in structuring the broiler to cook foods substantially without smoke and flame. Primarily, the invention is concerned with the cooking of meats from which fats are driven during the application of heat thereto, and more particularly, to the cooking of meats so that the fats may be most readily removed therefrom, and in this regard the meat is supported on a grill beneath which the heating element is arranged so that the fats exuding from the meat fall downwardly from the undersurface of the meat. The invention is further concerned with the nearly complete elimination of smoking and flaming caused by burning fats so that the meat being cooked is not subjected to the smoking and flaming products of burning fats, and so that the broiler may be used within a home without necessitating the venting of the cooking surface to the outside atmosphere.

During operation of the broiler, the structural components are maintained outside of the smoke and flame temperature range of fats so that any fats contacting any components of the broiler will not smoke or flame. The heating element is maintained above the smoke and flame temperature range, while the other structural components are maintained below the smoke and flame temperature range. Fats falling onto the heating element roll off and fall to the bottom of the broiler and do not smoke or flame. Fats collecting in the bottom of the broiler do not smoke or flame, and fats adhering to the grill do not smoke or flame.

9. Allen A. Shoup, inventor of the patent in suit, commenced in 1958 development of a broiler that could be used indoors. In 1960, he completed his invention of a smokeless and flameless broiler that could be used indoors and which cooked foods by broiling.

10. In 1961, Allen Shoup commenced manufacture of his invention in Wisconsin.

11. On February 13, 1961, Allen A. Shoup filed a patent application which matured into the patent in suit.

12. Plaintiff Marian Shoup owned and operated a restaurant in Chicago in 1961 and met Allen Shoup in early 1961 when he was a patron at the restaurant.

13. Allen Shoup brought one of his smokeless and flameless broilers to plaintiff's restaurant for her use and on which she cooked hamburgers and other foods.

14. Plaintiff married Allen Shoup on June 16, 1961, and Mr. Shoup died May 4, 1965.

15. Plaintiff assisted Allen A. Shoup in the marketing of the smokeless broiler invention by attending trade shows and demonstrating the operation of the broiler.

16. Plaintiff served as a model in connection with the broiler invention on advertising and instructional materials.

17. Allen A. Shoup first developed and marketed a Model 1 broiler and next developed and marketed a Model 2 broiler, and finally developed and marketed a Model 5 broiler.

18. During operation of the Shoup Model 5 broiler, fats on the grill, falling between and onto the heating surfaces of the heating element, and falling onto the surface below the heating element, will not smoke or flame.

19. The Shoup Model 5 broiler operates smokelessly and flamelessly.

20. The representative prior art shows both overfired and underfired broilers, but does not teach a smokeless and flameless broiler.

21. The prior art relied on by the defendant does not teach a smokeless and flameless broiler.

22. The U.S. Davis Patent 1,504,102 does not recognize the smoke and flame temperature range phenomena for fat, but discloses an underfired broiler which includes a catchment well at the food supporting surface for collecting fats, thereby implying that the fats would not be allowed to generally fall downwardly onto the heating element and a flue for removing fumes that may be formed by the consumption of fats dripping onto the heated corrugated plate 21, thereby implying that the corrugated plate 21 operates at a temperature that would cause smoking of fats impinging thereon.

23. The U.S. Del Francia, et al. Patent 2,813,706, while showing an underfired broiler, would not be suitable for use indoors without an exhaust hood, as it specifically intends to create flame by the burning of fat during the broiling of foods.

24. The U.S. Joseph Patent 2,903,549, while showing an underfired broiler, positions the heating element directly on the bed of refractory material 47 that would most certainly cause the flaming or smoking of fats impinging on the refractory bed.

25. The U.S. Bernstein Patent 2,956,497 shows an overfired broiler which is not at all pertinent to the Shoup invention.

26. The Australian Patent 17523/34, while showing an underfired broiler, would not be suitable for indoor cooking without the use of an exhaust hood for fumes, inasmuch as it clearly contemplates smoking or flaming of fats during the cooking process.

27. The Black Angus B-67 broiler is another example of the prior art that does not teach the principle of having a smokeless and a flameless broiler.

28. The Black Angus B-67 broiler smokes considerably more than the Shoup Model 5 broiler.

29. The Black Angus B-67 broiler is not a smokeless broiler.

30. Bacon cooked on the Black Angus B-67 broiler the same period of time as bacon cooked on the Shoup Model 5 broiler is charred, while the bacon cooked on the Shoup Model 5 broiler is not charred.

31. The Shoup patent describes a smokeless and flameless broiler in sufficiently clear, concise and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art of broilers to make and use the invention.

32. The Shoup patent discloses a smokeless and flameless broiler which is novel and patentable.

33. The Shoup patent discloses a smokeless and flameless broiler which would not have been obvious at the time the Shoup invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art of broilers.

34. The Shoup patent discloses and claims an underfired broiler for cooking foods smokelessly and flamelessly, which includes a heating element operating at a temperature such that when fats impinge thereon, they will not smoke or flame, a grill mounted above the heating element for supporting foods and spaced therefrom such that fats on the grill will not smoke or flame, a surface or grease pan mounted below the heating element spaced from the heating element such that when fats are in engagement with the heating element, they will not smoke or flame, and a support means for the heating element, grill and

grease pan arranged to operate outside the smoke and flame temperature range of fats.

35. The claims in the Shoup patent clearly point out and particularly claim the subject matter of the invention in clear and definite terms.

36. The claims in the Shoup patent are not restricted to a broiler structure where the spacing between the heating element and the grill and the heating element and the grease pan are at a precise dimension other than that which would prevent smoking or flaming of fats on the grill or on the grease pan.

37. The claims in the Shoup patent cover the smokeless and flameless broiler structure of the Shoup invention.

38. There is no single prior art patent which shows an underfired broiler that is smokeless and flameless and which meets all of the limitations of the claims in the Shoup patent.

39. The claims in the Shoup patent distinguish over the prior art relied upon by defendant, as they do not show a smokeless and flameless broiler that can be used indoors without an exhaust hood, and they do not teach the operation of a heating element above the smoke and flame temperature range.

40. No testimony was offered as to how any of the prior art references cited by defendant and the Black Angus B-67 broiler could be combined to make the Shoup invention obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art.

41. The smoke and flame temperature range phenomena of fats is not disclosed in any of the prior art patents or by the Black Angus B-67 broiler.

42. The solving of the smokeless and flameless broiler problem is not anticipated by the prior art or by the Black Angus B-67 broiler.

43. No clear and convincing testimony or evidence was offered by defendant that the Shoup invention was obvious in view of the prior art, or in view of the Black Angus B-67 broiler at the time the Shoup invention was made.

44. While it appears an attempt was made in the development of the Black Angus B-67 broiler to provide a broiler that would be smokeless and flameless, such attempt failed.

45. The Shoup smokeless and flameless broiler was developed and sold prior to the Dominion smokeless and flameless broiler.

46. Subsequent to the development and sale of the Shoup broiler, many other smokeless broilers were marketed, including the Dominion broiler, the Farberware broiler, the Toastmaster broiler.

47. The Toastmaster broiler is made by McGraw Edison.

48. The Farberware broiler is made by the S.W. Farber Division of Walter Kidde & Co.

49. The Cory broiler is made by Cory Corp. and is the same as the Shoup broiler Model 5.

50. The Toastmaster broiler, the Farberware broiler, the Cory broiler and the Dominion broiler were first made subsequent to the Shoup broiler.

51. The manufacturers of the Toastmaster broiler, the Cory broiler and the Farberware broiler were licensed under the Shoup patent.

52. McGraw Edison, S.W. Farber and Dominion all obtained patents on their broilers subsequent to the Shoup patent.

53. The Toastmaster broiler and the Farberware broiler operate smokelessly and flamelessly.

54. The Dominion broiler includes a heating element operating above the smoke and flame temperature range of fats, together with a grill spaced above the heating element such that fats on the grill will not smoke or flame, and a grease pan spaced below the heating element such that when fats impinge on the grease pan, they will not smoke or flame, whether or not the reflective shield is positioned in the grease pan.

55. While cooking bacon on the Dominion broiler, fats falling on the reflector in the grease pan do not smoke or flame, fats hitting the heating element do not smoke or flame, but just roll off and drop into the pan, and fats hitting the pan with the reflector removed do not smoke.

56. During operation of the Dominion broiler and the cooking of bacon thereon, the only smoke observed came from the underside of the bacon and the central portion where sufficient heat is trapped to raise the temperature of the fats to cause them to smoke.

57. Claims 1 and 3 to 6 define the Shoup invention in terms of a broiler structure with elements arranged to avoid smoking and flaming during the cooking of foods.

58. Claim 2 defines a method of broiling foods which essentially consists of operating the broiler of the Shoup invention during the cooking of foods thereon.

59. Claim 3 differs from Claims 1, 4, 5 and 6 in that it additionally defines having water in the pan for facilitating the removal of fats therefor.

60. Claim 5 differentiates from Claims 1, 3, 4 and 6 in defining means operating outside the smoke and flame temperature range for shielding the intermediate supporting means against falling fats.

61. Claims 1 and 3 to 6 clearly cover a broiler utilizing as a heating element a Calrod, as shown in Figs. 5 and 6 of the patent.

62. The operation of the Dominion broiler with or without the shield in the grease pan infringes method Claim 2 of the Shoup patent.

63. The Dominion broiler with or without the reflective shield in the grease pan clearly infringes Claims 1, 4 and 6 of the Shoup patent.

64. The Dominion broiler in its latest configuration as evidenced by the deposition exhibit in the Satkunas deposition, clearly infringes Claims 1 and 4, 5, 6 in that this broiler includes a shield over the intermediate supporting means for the element.

65. The Dominion broiler clearly infringes Claim 3 wherein water could be put in the grease pan to facilitate removal of fats even though the instructions for the operation of the Dominion broiler do not specify that water be placed in the bottom of the pan.

66. The manufacturing, selling and using of the Dominion broiler infringes Claims 1 to 6 of the Shoup patent.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

1. This Court has jurisdiction of the parties and of the subject matter of the issues herein involved, and venue is properly laid in this district as to the defendant Marshall Field & Co.

2. Plaintiff is the owner of the Shoup Patent 3,174,863.

3. The patent and each claim thereof shall be presumed valid and the burden of establishing invalidity of the patent or any claim thereof rests upon the party asserting same under 35 U.S.C. §282. *Mumm v. Jacob E. Decker & Sons*, 301 U.S. 168, 171 (1937); *King-Seeley Thermos Co. v. Tastee Freez Industries, Inc.*, 357 F.2d 875, 879, 149 U.S.P.Q. 4, 7 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 817 (1966).

4. The party asserting invalidity has a heavy burden of establishing same by clear and convincing evidence. *Mumm v. Jacob E. Decker & Sons*, 301 U.S. 168 (1937); *Mercantile National Bank of Chicago v. Quest, Inc.*, 166 U.S.P.Q. 513, 421 F.2d 261, cert. denied (CA 7, 1970); *Hazeltine Research, Inc. v. Dage Electric Company, Inc.*, 271 F.2d 218 (CA 7, 1959).

5. In order for the patent to be invalid under 35 U.S.C. 102, it must be clearly and convincingly established that the patent, the publication, or the prior sale stand alone as a full anticipation of the invention in the Shoup patent. *Illinois Tool Works, Inc. v. Foster Grant Co., Inc.*, 181 U.S.P.Q. 553, 569 (D.C. N.D. Ill. 1974).

6. In order for the patent to be invalid under 35 U.S.C. 103, it must be clearly and convincingly established that the invention was obvious in view of the prior art at the time the invention was made. *Illinois Tool Works, Inc. v. Foster Grant Co., Inc.*, 181 U.S.P.Q. 570 (D.C. N.D. Ill. 1974).

7. That the claims in the Shoup patent do not cite the spacing dimensions between the grill and heating element and between the heating element and grease pan will not invalidate the patent under 35 U.S.C. §112. *Binks Mfg.*

Co. v. Ransburg Electro-Coating Corp., 281 F.2d 252 (7th Cir.).

8. If there is no evidence that the existence of a problem is not known to those skilled in the art at the time of the invention, it is not proper to conclude the invention which solves this problem would have been obvious. *In re Namiya*, 184 U.S.P.Q. 607, 612-613 (CCPA, 1975).

9. When the evidence shows that others in the art attempted to solve the same problem and failed in their efforts and did not arrive at the solution claimed by the patent in suit, the statutory presumption of validity is substantially strengthened. *Reeves Instrument Corp. v. Beckman Instruments, Inc.*, 444 F.2d 263, 272, 170 U.S.P.Q. 74, 81 (9th Cir.), *cert. denied*, 404 U.S. 951 (1971); *Neff Instrument Corp. v. Cohu Electronics, Inc.*, 298 F.2d 82, 87, 132 U.S.P.Q. 98, 101, 102 (9th Cir. 1961).

10. The inquiry into patentability must be directed toward the subject matter as a whole and not to the elements of the claimed combination and their individual novelty, and therefore a patented combination which results in a more facile, economical or efficient unit, or which provides results unachieved by prior art structures, cannot be anticipated piecemeal by a showing that the various elements of the invention are individually old. *Reese v. Elkhart Welding and Boiler Works, Inc.*, 447 F.2d 517, 526 (7th Cir. 1971); *Uarco Inc. v. Moore Business Forms, Inc.*, 440 F.2d 580, 584 (7th Cir.), *cert. denied*, 404 U.S. 873 (1971); *Bela Seating Co. v. Polaron Products, Inc.*, 297 F.Supp. 489, 508 (N.D. Ill. 1968), *aff'd. on other grounds*, 438 F.2d 733 (7th Cir.), *cert. denied*, 403 U.S. 922 (1971).

11. The difference between the subject matter set forth in the Shoup Patent 3,174,863 and the subject matter of the cited prior art references as a whole would not have

been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person of ordinary skill in the art to which such subject matter pertains under 35 U.S.C. §103.

12. The Shoup patent is good and valid in law and was duly granted by the United States Patent Office in accordance with the patent laws.

13. The Shoup patent particularly points out and distinctly claims the invention in accordance with 35 U.S.C. §112.

14. The Shoup patent discloses and claims patentable subject matter in accordance with 35 U.S.C. §101.

15. The Shoup patent discloses and claims a new invention that was not previously known or used, that was not previously patented or shown in a printed publication before the invention in the patent or more than one year before the filing date of the patent, that was not sold in this country more than a year before the filing date of the patent, all in accordance with 35 U.S.C. §102.

16. The Shoup patent discloses and claims a new invention that was not obvious at the time the invention was made and thus was granted in accordance with 35 U.S.C. §103.

17. Patents are not limited to the embodiment of the invention described in the specification and drawings since the patent claims measure the invention. If the accused device achieves substantially the same results in substantially the same way as the patented device, the devices are the same in the eyes of the patent law. *Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Products Co.*, 399 U.S. 605, 608 (1950); *King-Seeley Thermos Co. v. Tastee Freez Industries, Inc.*, 357 F.2d 875, 880 (7th Cir.), *cert. denied*, 385 U.S. 817 (1966).

18. One appropriating the principle and mode of operation of a patented device, and obtaining its results by the same or equivalent means, may not avoid infringement by making a device different in form, even though it be more or less efficient than the patented device. *Reese v. Elkhart Welding and Boiler Works, Inc.*, 447 F.2d 517, 527, 171 U.S.P.Q. 129, 136 (7th Cir. 1971); *Paper Converting Machine Co. v. FMC Corp.*, 409 F.2d 344, 353, 161 U.S.P.Q. 67, 75 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 877, (1969); *Nordberg Mfg. Co. v. Woolery Machine Co.*, 79 F.2d 685, 692, 27 U.S.P.Q. 189, 196 (7th Cir. 1935).

19. The addition of an added element to a combination called for by a patent does not avoid infringement of the patent. *Holland Co. v. American Steel Foundries*, 190 F.2d 37, 38, 90 U.S.P.Q. 1, 2 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 859 (1959); *Columbia Wire Co. v. Kokomo Steel & Wire Co.*, 143 Fed. 116, 123 (7th Cir. 1905); *Henrickson v. Cory Corp.*, 140 U.S.P.Q. 286, 288, 327 F.2d 409 (CA 7, 1964).

20. Claims 1, 4 and 6 read directly on the Dominion broiler.

21. Claims 1, 3, 4, 5 and 6 read directly on the later embodiment of the Dominion broiler as identified in the Satkunas deposition where a shield is provided at the connection of the heating element with the power supply socket.

22. Claim 2 reads directly on the operation of the Dominion broiler.

23. Claim 3 reads essentially on the structure of the Dominion broiler in that water can easily be added to the grease collecting tray for facilitating removal of fats therefrom.

24. The Dominion broiler with or without the shield in the grease pan infringes the patent in suit in accordance with the tests of infringement established in this circuit. *Rockwell v. Midland Ross Corp.*, 169 U.S.P.Q. 5, 13, 438 F.2d 635 (7th Cir. 1971); *Leach v. Rockwood & Co.*, 158 U.S.P.Q. 518, 521, 404 F.2d 652 (7th Cir. 1968).

JUDGMENT ORDER

It is the judgment of the Court that the Shoup Patent 3,174,863 is valid, that the Dominion broiler infringes the Shoup patent, that the defendant be and hereby is enjoined against further infringement of the patent, that plaintiff be granted an injunction against further infringement of the patent by Scovill Manufacturing Company, that the counterclaim of defendant be dismissed with prejudice, that defendant pay to plaintiff the amount of damages arising from the patent infringement as determined by an accounting. The questions of costs, increasing damages under Title 35 U.S.C. §284, the amount and period of interest and attorney's fees under Title 35 U.S.C. §285 are reserved until the accounting period.

ENTER:

/s/ FRANK J. MCGARR

United States District Judge

APPENDIX D

Amended Judgment of District Court

(Dated June 16, 1975)

Civil Action No. 69-C-1682

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
For the Northern District of Illinois
Eastern Division

MARIAN SHOUP,
Plaintiff,

v.

MARSHALL FIELD & CO.,
Defendant.

AMENDED JUDGMENT

In accordance with the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law entered June 4, 1975,

It is the judgment of the Court that the Shoup patent No. 3,174,863 is valid, that the Dominion broiler infringes the Shoup patent, that the defendant be and hereby is enjoined against further infringement of the patent, that plaintiff be granted an injunction against further infringement of the patent by defendant, that the counterclaim of defendant be dismissed with prejudice, that defendant pay to plaintiff the amount of damages arising from the patent infringement as determined by an accounting. The questions of costs, increasing damages under Title 35 U.S.C., §284, the amount and period of interest and attorney's fees under Title 35 U.S.C., §285, are reserved until the account-

ing period. Cause is referred to Executive Committee for assignment to a Magistrate with instructions to take evidence on the issue of accounting and damages and to make a report and recommendation to the Court.

IT IS SO ORDERED:

/s/ FRANK J. MCGARR

United States District Judge

Date June 16, 1975

APPENDIX E

Statutes Involved

35 U.S.C. 261

§ 261. Ownership; assignment

Subject to the provisions of this title, patents shall have the attributes of personal property.

Applications for patent, patents, or any interest therein, shall be assignable in law by an instrument in writing. The applicant, patentee, or his assigns or legal representatives may in like manner grant and convey an exclusive right under his application for patent, or patents, to the whole or any specified part of the United States.

A certificate of acknowledgment under the hand and official seal of a person authorized to administer oaths within the United States, or, in a foreign country, of a diplomatic or consular officer of the United States or an officer authorized to administer oaths whose authority is proved by a certificate of a diplomatic or consular officer of the United States, shall be prima facie evidence of the execution of an assignment, grant or conveyance of a patent or application for patent.

An assignment, grant or conveyance shall be void as against any subsequent purchaser or mortgagee for a valuable consideration, without notice, unless it is recorded in the Patent and Trademark Office within three months from its date or prior to the date of such subsequent purchase or mortgage.

As amended Jan. 2, 1975, Pub.L. 93-596, § 1, 88 Stat. 1949.

35 U.S.C. 152

§ 152. Issue of patent to assignee

Patents may be granted to the assignee of the inventor of record in the Patent and Trademark Office, upon the application made and the specification sworn to by the inventor, except as otherwise provided in this title.

As amended Jan. 2, 1975, Pub.L. 93-596, § 1, 88 Stat. 1949.

35 U.S.C. 281

§ 281. Remedy for infringement of patent

A patentee shall have remedy by civil action for infringement of his patent. July 19, 1952, c. 950, § 1, 66 Stat. 812.